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‘The time has come to recognize that denials of individuals’ rights on the ground only that 
they are women are human rights violations, and to require state practices that expose 
women to degradation, indignity, and oppression on account of their sex to be inde-
pendently defined, condemned, compensated, and, preferably, prevented. The purpose 
of changing ubiquitous state practice may appear ambitious, but it is not too ambitious 
for the needs of our time.’1
‘[This Protocol] reaffirms the principle of promoting gender equality as enshrined in 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union as well as the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development, relevant Declarations, Resolutions and Decisions, which underline the 
commitment of the African States to ensure the full participation of African women as 
equal partners in Africa’s development.’2
‘The substantive realisation of equality is a precondition for transformative change in 
South Africa. Yet, inequality is still the biggest challenge facing development and trans-
formation in post-apartheid South Africa.’3
1 INTRODUCTION
Few would challenge the contention that violence against women has reached 
distressing levels, and, consequently, calls for serious debate and delibera-
tion. Although many attempts have been made since the late 1960s to make 
critical sense of this worrying phenomenon, the discourse driven by feminism 
*  This article is based in part on the paper ‘The impact of African sex practices on the construction 
of female sexuality: A constitutional perspective (Human rights and sexuality in Africa)’ presented 
at an international colloquium on Femmes et développement. La dimension juridique hosted by the 
Institut Catholique de Madagascar in Antananarivo, Madagascar, on May 23, 2008.
1 Cook RJ ‘State accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women’ in Cook RJ (ed) Human rights of women: National and international perspectives 
(1994) 228.
2 Preamble of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa passed by the Assembly of Heads of the African Union for adoption at its second 
session in Maputo, Mozambique, on 11 July 2003. The Protocol was the result of protracted negotia-
tions which commenced in 1995 and produced a Draft Protocol which was adopted on 15 November 
1999 in Kigali: see 1999 DOC/OS (XXXVII). The last meeting of African government experts to 
negotiate the Draft Protocol took place in November 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. See also n 13 
below.
3 Jagwanth S and Kalula E ‘Preface’ in Jagwanth S and Kalula E (eds) Equality law: Reflections from 
South Africa and elsewhere (2001) ix.
1
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to conceptualise gender-based and sexually based4 violence against women 
has arguably been the most convincing, and, accordingly, valuable, of these. 
Many of the ensuing feminist conceptions of violence against women5 can 
with relative ease – and with a fair degree of success – be transposed to 
legal discourse. Such a transposition could, in turn, facilitate both a useful 
and nuanced analysis of the human rights implications of gender-based and 
sexually based violence.
It is generally accepted within feminist discourse that violence against 
women emanates from (patriarchal) power and control, finding expression in 
both physical and sexual violence.6 No attempt to make critical sense of vio-
lence can, therefore, shy away from the impact of female sexuality on women’s 
oppression, no matter how controversial (or sensitive) this may seem. The (re-)
emergence of the practices of dry sex and virginity testing in traditional (Afri-
can) societies must be seen within this context. This will, in turn, necessitate 
the formulation of an appropriate (legal/human rights) response.
Such a response could take various forms. It could, for example, be argued 
that dry sex and virginity testing are useful and valuable traditional practices 
that seek to uphold cultural values in an increasingly westernised society. It 
could even be said that these two practices constitute appropriate responses 
to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. However, dry sex and virginity testing 
could also be seen as decidedly harmful, in that they seek to maintain (and 
indeed entrench) the cultural and sexually based subordination of women in 
Africa.
This article will explore the nature of gender-based and sexually based vio-
lence, with particular reference to the conception within the latter of dry sex 
and virginity testing. This will be undertaken against the backdrop of three 
key African human rights instruments – the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter),7 the Protocol to the African Charter on 
4 The ‘sex’/’gender’ distinction is fundamental to feminist discourse. The term ‘gender’ is widely used 
and understood in feminist theory to signify the socially constructed identity of men and women 
expressed in terms of being ‘male’ and ‘female’. ‘Sex’ is thus understood to be a biological term; 
‘gender’ a politically and culturally defined one. But since distinctions of gender, based on sex, 
structure virtually every aspect of our human reality, gender becomes the way in which one group 
is both socially differentiated from, and subordinated to, the other. The sex/gender distinction thus 
in effect becomes blurred and the terms could be used interchangeably. This is particularly evident 
in instances of so-called ‘gender-based’ and so-called ‘sexually based’ violence. The former would 
include the latter: see, in particular, Van der Poll L The constitutionality of pornography (2001) 281 
– 283. See also Van der Poll L ‘The emerging jurisprudence on sexual violence perpetrated against 
women during armed conflict’ (2007) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 8, and 
n 43 and n 127 below.
5 Although various schools of feminism have sought to make sense of sex-specific violence against 
women, the arguments advanced, and conceptions formulated, by the more radical streams of 
feminism have been the most plausible and academically sound. Some of these arguments will be 
considered in this article: see, in particular, part 4 and accompanying footnotes below. 
6 See n 43 below. According to the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project of Minnesota, USA, violence 
against women includes: (a) the use of intimidation; (b) emotional abuse; (c) the use of isolation (eg 
controlling the victim’s actions and restricting freedom of movement); (d) minimising and denying 
the abuse, and blaming the victim; (e) the use of children (eg making the victim feel guilty about the 
children); (f) the use of male privilege; (g) economic abuse; and (h) the use of coercion and threats.
7 7 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5 21 ILM 59 (1981).
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Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the African 
Women’s Protocol),8 and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (the Constitution).9 This will, inter alia, be done with a view to engender 
a suitable conception of (female) sexuality and human rights within African 
jurisprudence.
2 DEFINING ‘HARM’
Any attempt to conceptualise a traditional practice as (inherently) harmful (to 
women) is steeped in controversy, as it requires an appropriate test or suitable 
measure. Often the dichotomy that exists between African and western values 
is employed. Such a standard is not, however, appropriate, as it fails to appre-
ciate the reality of marginalisation and the (often extreme) consequences of 
societal power, particularly in traditional societies. Moreover, such a standard 
fails to engage with (and thus consider) the impact of (sexual) politics, and 
the disregard for the risks associated with a particular traditional practice or 
(interrelated) practices. Power struggles, local and national politics, and/or 
lack of understanding about the risks associated with a given practice often 
determine the success or failure of attempts to conceptualise a traditional 
practice as harmful.10
Various international and regional human rights instruments seek to protect 
women from discriminatory and abusive practices. These instruments may 
prove to be particularly useful in conceptualising a sexually based practice 
as (inherently) harmful to women. A basic argument against gender-specific 
discrimination on cultural (or customary) grounds could thus be formulated 
with relative ease. Such an argument could, by definition, also implicate cul-
tural practices specifically detrimental to the health of women.11
The African Charter, for example, includes express references to harmful 
gender-specific practices.12 So, too, does the African Women’s Protocol.13 The 
African Women’s Protocol, adopted in 2003,14 seeks to address particular 
issues affecting women, as these have emerged subsequent to the adoption 
of the African Charter in 1986. The African Women’s Protocol specifically 
articulates the concern that, despite the ratification of the African Charter 
8 See n 2 above.
9 When passed in 1996, the Constitution was referred to as the ‘Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996)’. However, pursuant to the coming into operation of the Citation of 
Constitutional Laws Act 5 of 2005, the Constitution is now cited as ‘Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996’ and no longer has any Act number.
10 See, in general, Reproductive Health Outlook ‘Harmful traditional practices: Overview and les-
sons learned’ (2002) available at www.rho.org/html/hthps_overview.html#introduction [accessed 
30/04/08].
11 The impact of dry sex and virginity testing on the health of women per se, including perspectives on 
women’s reproductive health, will not, however, form the primary object of this article.
12 Article 18(3) of the African Charter expressly states that ‘states shall ensure the elimination of every 
discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and child 
as stipulated in international declarations and conventions’. My emphasis.
13 See, in particular, Art 5 of the African Women’s Protocol. By comparison, Art 19(2)(b) and Art 17 of 
the Draft Protocol, respectively, granted women protection from all forms of intolerance, as well as 
repugnant cultural and religious practices, and the right to a positive cultural context.
14 See n 2 above.
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and other international human rights instruments by the majority of States 
Parties (and their solemn commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimina-
tion and harmful practices against women), women in Africa continue to 
be victims of discrimination and harmful practices. To this end the African 
Women’s Protocol endeavours to promote and protect a wide range of 
human rights, including the right to life, integrity and security of the person,15 
protection from harmful traditional practices,16 and protection of women in 
armed conflict.17 The African Women’s Protocol makes specific reference to 
the rights of women recognised and guaranteed in all international human 
rights instruments, notably, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,18 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,19 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights20 and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)21 
(and its Optional Protocol).22
Both the African Women’s Protocol and CEDAW are used as interpretive 
tools by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Afri-
can Commission).23 The African Charter, in turn, makes express reference to 
CEDAW and grants women all rights recognised under international law.24 
The common objective is the prohibition of harmful gender-specific practices, 
irrespective of whether they are culturally or traditionally sanctioned.
3  TRADITIONAL SEX PRACTICES OF DRY SEX AND 
VIRGINITY TESTING
3.1 Dry sex and vaginal drying
Dry sex involves the insertion of various drying or absorbent materials or 
agents into the vagina before (or during) sexual intercourse. A dry sex prepa-
ration may consist of vinegar, bleach, chlorine, toothpaste, soaps, powders 
or herbal potions.25 These absorbent materials or agents are inserted into 
15 See Art 4 of the African Women’s Protocol.
16 See Art 5 of the African Women’s Protocol.
17 See Art 11 of the African Women’s Protocol.
18 GA Res 217A(III); UN Doc A/810 (1948); UN Doc A/811, 10 December 1948.
19 GA Res 21/2200A, GAOR, 21st Session, Supp, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), UNTS 171, entered into force 
23 March 1976.
20 GA Res 21/2200A, GOAR, 21st Session, Supp, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into 
force 3 January 3 1976.
21 Ga Res 34/180 (1979). CEDAW was adopted unanimously by the United Nations on 18 December 
1979, opened for signature on 1 March 1980, and entered into force on 3 September 3 1981, follow-
ing receipt of the 20th ratification. CEDAW is widely acknowledged as the primary instrument to 
challenge the violation of women’s civil and political rights under international law. 
22 GA Res A/54/4 (1999).
23 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is charged by the African Charter to adju-
dicate complaints that challenge the actions of states under the provisions of the Charter.
24 Article 18(3) of the African Charter expressly refers to the protection of women’s rights as encapsu-
lated not only in the Charter itself, but also in other (international) human rights instruments.
25 Soul City et al HIV/AIDS: A resource for journalists (undated) 32 – 33, cited in Combrinck H and 
Wakefield L ‘Section 2: Understanding the context’ in Combrinck H and Wakefield L At the cross-
roads: Linking strategic frameworks to address gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa 
(2007) 23 n 31.
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the vagina in order to rid the vagina of any moisture or natural lubrication.26 
The intention is to achieve a hot, tight and dry sexual experience greatly 
sought after by men.27 It need not be argued that the desired result is not 
realised without a great deal of pain and discomfort. The vaginal walls swell 
in response to the drying agents, thus creating the impression that the vagina 
is smaller, and the penis consequently larger.28
Although the reasons for this practice are varied, commonalities do exist. 
Dry sex and vaginal drying are thought to minimise the number of girlfriends 
a husband is likely to have, and may even serve to prevent separation or 
divorce, as a loose vagina is considered an indication of infidelity. Men in 
traditional societies apparently also consider vaginal fluids to be unclean. 
This explains why the practice of dry sex is extremely popular in sub-Saharan 
Africa,29 and sex workers servicing the major truck stops in South Africa 
reportedly charge more for a dry sex experience.30 Men interviewed in focus 
groups reported mixed feelings about dry sex, yet expressed a dislike for vagi-
nal fluids; thus concluding that there was no other option but for the practice 
to continue.
The sexual health implications for both sexes are immense. AIDS workers 
argue that dry sex increases the risk of condom tearing, as friction during inter-
course is greater.31 In instances where no condoms are used, the probability 
increases that the vaginal wall will tear. Consequently women are exposed 
to an even greater risk of contracting the HIV virus or sexually transmitted 
disease (STD) infections.32
3.2 Virginity testing
Virginity testing currently enjoys a spirited revival in South Africa. The main 
rationale behind the practice appears to be the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Virgin-
ity testing, as practised in traditional communities, requires mature women 
to insert their fingers into the vagina to ascertain whether the hymen is still 
intact. Those who pass the test are certified as virgins for a nominal fee of 
R5.00.33 Certified virginity is greeted with praise and ululation.34 The age 
group of girls subjected to virginity testing varies, as tests may be conducted 
at the request of either parents or the community. This has produced a situ-
ation where children as young as three years have reportedly been subjected 
26 See n 25 above.
27 See Morar NS and Karim SSA ‘Vaginal insertion and douching practices among sex workers at truck 
stops in KwaZulu-Natal’ (1998) 88 South African Medical Journal 470.
28 See Schoofs M ‘The village voice: Aids – the agony of Africa’ Part 5 Death and the second sex avail-
able at www.africa.com/column/aids_06.html [accessed 30/04/08]. 
29 See n 10 above.
30 See n 27 above.
31 See n 25 above.
32 See, in general, Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women 
and Children Report on the regional seminar on traditional practices affecting the health of women and 
children in Africa (1987 and 1990).
33 Approximately US 50c.
34 See Bell N ‘Virginity newly prized in the age of AIDS’ available at www.africana.com/dailyarticles/
index_2000133.html_2k [accessed 30/04/08].
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to testing.35 With the high incidence of child abuse in South Africa, the testing 
of pre-pubescent girls is apparently sanctioned as a means to detect sexual 
abuse. An intact hymen would suggest the absence of sexual abuse.36 Note-
worthy is the testing of women who are in their fifties, a practice seemingly 
intended to lend prestige and legitimacy to virginity testing. Since certified 
virginity is considered a sign of purity and well-being in traditional societies, 
it is a decisive factor in determining the bride price during lobola (dowry) 
negotiations. In KwaZulu-Natal, for instance, the standard lobola price per 
bride is reported to be ten head of cattle; certified virgins will fetch eleven 
head of cattle.37
The pervasive (African) myth that sexual intercourse with a virgin cures 
HIV/AIDS has been widely reported.38 Virginity testing may unwittingly 
render women even more defenseless against acts of sexual violence, nota-
bly rape. Moreover, the practice of virginity testing may encourage young 
girls to engage in unprotected anal sex,39 thus indeed increasing the risk of 
HIV/AIDS infection.40 In addition, certified virginity may also render women 
extremely vulnerable to abduction, and the practice of gang rape. As Carol 
Bower rightly argues:
‘In a society with high levels of gang-related activities, where the rape, and even murder, 
of a virgin forms part of the initiation of gang members, public identification of virgins 
could become a death sentence.’41
When subjected to logical and critical scrutiny, the practice of virginity testing 
is shown to render those who are already at risk potentially more vulnerable 
to harm, violence and exploitation.
4  IS IT A QUESTION OF POWER? BELIEFS THAT DRIVE 
TRADITIONAL PRACTICES
The sex difference is arguably one of power.42 Patriarchal societies are funda-
mentally hierarchal, engineered to sustain sex inequality.43 Male control over 
35 See n 34 above.
36 See n 34 above.
37 See also n 33 above.
38 See, for example, Joubert JJ ‘Zuma steun “as vader” maagdelikheidstoetse’ available at www.news.24.
com/Die_Burger/Nuus/0,,4-75_1626421,00.html [accessed 25/11/04]; and Clayton J ‘South Africa 
ready to ban “degrading” virginity tests’ available at www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1927475,00.
html [accessed 18/04/06].
39 Hlongwa W ‘Teens turn to anal sex to keep virginity’, cited in Bower C ‘Virginity testing: In whose 
interest?’ (November 2005) Aids Legal Quarterly 9 n 11. 
40 See, in general, Stein J ‘Virginity test in Aids war’ available at www.news24.com/citypress/citypress-
news01885,186_906042,00.html [accessed 30/04/08]. See also note 87 below.
41 Bower C ‘Virginity testing: In whose interest?’ (November 2005) Aids Law Quarterly 9. The author is 
the Executive Director of Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN), 
South Africa.
42 See, in particular, MacKinnon CA ‘The liberal state’ in MacKinnon CA Toward a feminist theory of 
the state (1989) 160 and Bryson V ‘Modern radical feminism: Knowledge, language and patriarchy’ 
in Bryson V Feminist political theory: An introduction (1992) 222 – 231. See also n 4 above.
43 See, in this regard, MacKinnon CA Toward a feminist theory of the state (1989) n 39 160 n 39; 
Hanmer J ‘Violence and the social control of women’ in Littlejohn G et al Power and the state (1978) 
229; and Vance CS ‘Pleasure and danger: Toward a politics of sexuality’ in Vance CS (ed) Pleasure 
and danger: Exploring female sexuality (1992) 3.
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female sexuality could thus be seen as the origin, or root cause, of women’s 
(sexual) subordination.44
As the dominant group, (heterosexual) men construct (female) sexuality 
solely for their intended benefit and pleasure. This occurs through the pow-
erful, all encompassing process of (sexual) objectification. Conceptualised 
within this particular paradigm, male control over female sexuality, facilitated 
through the sexual objectification of the female, thus constitutes violence per 
se.45
It need not be argued that dry sex and virginity testing implicate both 
women’s agency and their sexuality. A due appreciation of the material condi-
tions of (African) women’s lives, particularly as these are revealed in relation 
to their sexuality, sharply calls into question the extent to which women can 
be construed as free, independent agents, exercising unrestricted choices as 
a free expression of their sexual desires. Consequently the beliefs that drive 
and sustain cultural sex practices warrant closer inspection.
Cultural beliefs attribute value to traditional practices, and attach sanctions 
to non-compliance. Women’s sexuality is directly implicated by practices and 
sanctions emanating from societal sex norms. The traditional understanding 
of vaginal fluids, for example, is centred on ‘uncleanness’, and its supposedly 
negative impact on fertilisation. Dry sex thus serves as a direct means to 
clean and strengthen the body, tone the pelvic muscles, cure STDs, main-
tain both male and female sexual fidelity, and even curb the scourge of HIV/
AIDS.46 Yet Leclerc Madlala rightly questions the latter justification for dry 
sex in a South African context. She points out that ‘in a country that bears the 
dubious distinction of having the world’s highest statistics for rape, virginity 
testing is nonsensical as an Aids preventative measure’.47
It need not be argued that women lack societal power to influence core 
beliefs that impact on their sexuality, and indeed their very identity. Moreo-
ver, the sole responsibility and accountability for sexual behaviour is placed 
on women in a sphere where men enjoy the greater power and influence.
The pressure to satisfy men sexually is further underscored by the fact that 
women in traditional societies routinely visit traditional healers to undergo 
a procedure expressly intended to attract male sexual attention.48 The pro-
cedure requires a small incision to be made in the labia. This is done with 
the aid of an ordinary razor blade, whereafter herbal substances are rubbed 
into the wound. The practice, referred to as ukugcaba, is performed every two 
months, and it is believed that, once these herbal substances enter the blood, 
44 See Itzin C ‘Pornography and the social construction of sexual inequality’ in Itzin C (ed) Pornogra-
phy, violence and civil liberties (1992) 65 – 68 and Steinem G ‘Erotica and pornography: A clear and 
present difference’ in Lederer L (ed) Take back the night: Women on pornography (1982) 37 – 38.
45 See Rubin G ‘Feminism and participatory democracy: Some reflections on sexual difference and 
citizenship’ in Kemp S and Squires J (eds) Feminisms (1997) 196.
46 See n 28 above.
47 Cited in Schoofs M (n 28 above).
48 See n 29 above.
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the sexual attention of the opposite sex will be aroused.49 As Carol Bower 
rightly observes:
‘Notions of [girls] as owned by their parents and of their virginity status as representing 
the “honour” of their families, lie behind the insistence of knowing whether or not the 
hymen is intact. It remains true in South Africa that women’s status is largely determined 
by their relationship to men – father, husband, brother or son. For this system to work, 
it is absolutely necessary to know to whom each child born “belongs” – i.e. who is that 
child’s father?’50
It could well be argued that the abuses of women result from, and are com-
pounded by, their social, economic and political inequalities. Lack of access to 
education, land, financial resources, and health care, coupled with women’s 
inequality within the family, render it virtually impossible for them to live free 
from (sexual) abuse and violence. Viewed through this particular (feminist) 
lens, the two practices are not all that different. Social coercion is, after all, 
fundamentally driven by patriarchal needs and desires, expressed through 
the medium of (female) sexuality. Arguments supporting women’s agency 
and the idea that women, as a group, can freely express their sexual desire 
within such a decidedly patriarchal social, economic and political context 
thus become highly suspect.
Since many abuses of women’s rights, especially gender violence, result 
from private action, it becomes imperative to invoke human rights standards 
as a defence against such abuses. The possible human rights implications of 
dry sex and virginity testing will be considered next.
5  DRY SEX AND VIRGINITY TESTING: TRADITION OR 
(SEX) SUBORDINATION?
5.1 An African perspective
5.1.1 The African Charter
The African Charter entrenches rights and freedoms similar to those com-
monly found in international and regional human rights documents. To this 
end Article 2 reads:
‘Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised 
and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status.’
This non-discrimination clause thus expressly prohibits differentiation on the 
basis of sex. In addition, every individual is considered to be equal before the 
law and shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.51 The African Char-
ter also expressly recognises the right to liberty and security of the person, 
albeit in rather gender-insensitive terms.52 Article 18 recognises the family 
49 See n 29 above.
50 Bower C (n 41 above) 7. Emphasis in the original.
51 Article 3 of the African Charter stipulates: ‘1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 2. Every 
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.’
52 Article 6 of the African Charter states: ‘Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the 
security of his person.’ My emphasis.
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as the natural unit and basis of society, whose physical and moral health 
shall be protected by the state.53 The family is furthermore acknowledged as 
the custodian of morals and traditional values recognised by the community, 
and the state is likewise expected to assist the family in discharging its duty 
as custodian of these values.54 Article 18 also places a specific obligation on 
the state to eliminate every discrimination against women. To this end Article 
18(3) stipulates that:
‘The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also 
ensure  the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in interna-
tional declarations and conventions.’
The African Charter thus acknowledges, and accentuates, the importance 
of recognising the protection afforded to women and children under various 
international human rights documents. Yet the African Charter also appears 
to be couched in decidedly communitarian terms, thus advancing a distinc-
tive communitarian conception of human rights.55 The manner in which the 
African Charter is perceived and interpreted will therefore be decisive factors 
in the advancement of (women’s) rights.
The African conception of human rights is generally viewed with suspicion 
by western thinkers.56 The African notion that the individual is submerged in 
the community is often criticised, and seen as an attempt to marginalise (and 
thus discard) rights and freedoms typically afforded to individuals or groups 
of individuals.57 It follows that, if African societies embrace a communitar-
ian understanding of human rights, issues affecting women are likely to be 
overlooked. The fact that most African societies are also deeply patriarchal 
further compounds women’s dilemma.
In addition, the legal, political and social obligations of states toward 
individuals are thought to be situated in the public sphere. Consequently a 
clear distinction is typically drawn by western thinkers between the public 
and private spheres.58 In an acknowledgement of the moral autonomy of 
the individual, the state may only interfere in the public domain.59 Interna-
53 Article 18(1) of the African Charter reads: ‘The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. 
It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral health.’
54 Article 18(2) provides: ‘The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of 
morals and traditional values recognised by the community.’
55 See n 53 and n 54 above.
56 See, in general, Howard R ‘Communitarianism and liberalism in the debates on human rights in 
Africa’ (1992) 11 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 1.
57 See, in general, Sanders AJGM ‘On African socialism and natural law thinking’ (1978) 11 Compara-
tive and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 68 and Sanders AJGM ‘On African socialism 
and the rule of law’ (1982) 15 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 299.
58 This distinction is common in liberal political theory: see, in general, Borchorst A and Siim B ‘Women 
and the advanced welfare state – A new kind of patriarchal power’ in Sassoon AS (ed) Women and 
the state: The shifting boundaries between public and private (1987); Herness H ‘The welfare state, 
citizenship and Scandinavian women’ in Jones K and Jonasdottir A (eds) The political interests of 
gender: Developing theory and research with a human face (1988); Siim B ‘Welfare state, gender 
politics and equality principles: Women’s citizenship in the Scandinavian welfare state’ in Meehan 
E and Sevenhuijsen S (eds) Equality principles and politics (1991); and Smart C Feminism and the 
power of law (1989).
59 See Fallon R ‘What is republicanism and is it worth reviving?’ (1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 1695 
and Gardbaum S ‘Law, politics and the claims of community’ (1992) 90 Michigan Law Review 685.
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tional human rights instruments have, however, sanctioned increased and 
legitimised state interference in the private sphere. The African Commission, 
indeed, interprets the African Charter with due appreciation of the rights 
and freedoms of the individual. To this end the African Commission rejects 
the alienation and subordination of the individual, and promotes the co-
existence of individuals within the community.60 Any notion of the individual 
in opposition to the community thus appears to be rejected by the African 
Commission.
Moreover, the African understanding of the relationship between the state 
and the individual shows no clear distinction or demarcation between the 
public and private spheres.61 The state is present in both public and private 
life. ‘The state is not above, nor outside, nor sovereign … [it] co-exists, co-
inhabits [and] communicates with the society from which it is inseparable.’62 
Since there is no separation of civil society and the state, the African Charter 
has both vertical63 and horizontal64 application. It could well be argued that 
states have to take appropriate measures that ensure the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination against women that typically occur in the private 
domain.
It must be stressed that practices that harm the individual ultimately cause 
disunity in (and therefore harm to) the community.65 Traditional practices 
that are harmful cannot be used as a means to justify the subordination of the 
individual to the group.66 This would, in fact, stand in direct opposition to the 
spirit of both the African Charter and the African Women’s Protocol.
A violation of the individual is a violation of the collective.67 The obliga-
tion of African states is, therefore, to ensure that tradition does not sanction 
practices that violate the dignity and security of the individual.68 More spe-
cifically, states are compelled under the African Charter to eradicate every 
60 See Murray R ‘The Notion of a State’ in Murray R (ed) The Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and International Law (2000) 34.
61 In contrast to the strict demarcation commonly encountered in classical liberal philosophy: see, in 
particular, n 58 above.
62 See Murray R (n 60 above) 35.
63 The narrowest conception of a Charter of Rights is that it contains so-called ‘negative liberties’: see 
Posner J in Jackson v City of Joliet 715 F 2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir) (1983) 1206. This means that it is 
intended to protect individuals against state power by listing rights that cannot be violated by the 
state, either by means of law or through the conduct of state actors. This ‘vertical’ relationship thus 
exists between individuals and the state.
64 A Charter of Rights that has solely vertical application will place duties on the state not to violate the 
rights of individuals, but will not place similar duties on individuals. The ‘horizontal’ application of 
a Charter of Rights thus implies that individuals are directly bound to uphold constitutional rights: 
see, for example, Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para 45.
65 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) where O’Regan J explained that Black people were not 
afforded respect during the apartheid era. The mere denial of respect to one group of persons meant 
the denial of respect to the community as a whole. The African Commission maintains this under-
standing of the individual and the community. The denial of human dignity to one group (women) 
will impact on the community as a whole.
66 See, in general, Sohn L ‘Protection of individuals’ (1982) 32 American Law Review 17 – 18.
67 See Umezurike O ‘The status of human rights’ (1995) 5 Constitutional Rights Journal 11.
68 See Murray R (n 60 above) 38. 
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discrimination against women.69 When coupled with the African Women’s 
Protocol’s commitment to eradicate gender-specific violence, the practices of 
dry sex and virginity testing cannot remain unchallenged. A discussion of 
some pertinent aspects of the African Women’s Protocol follows next.
5.1.2 The African Women’s Protocol
The African Women’s Protocol expresses in its Preamble the firm conviction 
that ‘any practice that hinders or endangers the normal growth and affects 
the physical and psychological development of women and girls should be 
condemned and eliminated’. The Preamble furthermore expresses the deter-
mination to ‘ensure that the rights of women are promoted, realised and 
protected in order to enable them to enjoy fully all their human rights’.
The definition clause of the African Women’s Protocol, inter alia, concep-
tualises ‘discrimination against women’, ‘harmful practices’, and ‘violence 
against women’. Article 1(f) stipulates that ‘discrimination against women’ 
means:
‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and 
whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the 
exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in all spheres of life’.
‘Harmful practices’ are defined as:
‘all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights 
of women and girls, such as their right to life, health, dignity, education and physical 
integrity’.70
In turn, violence against women includes ‘all acts perpetrated against women 
which cause (or could cause) them physical, sexual, psychological and eco-
nomic harm’. This also includes ‘the threat to take such acts’.71
The obligation of States Parties to eliminate discrimination against women 
is articulated in Article 2. States Parties are required to ‘combat all forms of 
discrimination72 against women through appropriate legislative, institutional 
and other measures’. In particular, appropriate legislative or regulatory 
measures must be effectively implemented to curb ‘harmful practices which 
endanger the health and general well-being of women’.73 Moreover, States 
Parties are required to ‘integrate a gender perspective in their policy deci-
sions, legislation, development plans, programmes and activities’, as well as 
in ‘all other spheres of life’.74 It is of particular significance to note that cor-
rective and positive action must be taken in those areas where discrimination 
against women continues to exist in law and in fact.75 Article 2, therefore, 
places a positive obligation upon States Parties to actively address all prac-
69 See Art 18(3) of the African Charter. See also n 53 and n 54 supra.
70 See Art 1(g) of the African Women’s Protocol.
71 See Art 1(j) of the African Women’s Protocol. My emphasis.
72 My emphasis.
73 See Art 2(b) of the African Women’s Protocol.
74 See Art 2(c) of the African Women’s Protocol.
75 See Art 2(d) of the African Women’s Protocol.
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tices deemed harmful to women that impact on, and endanger, the health and 
general well-being of women in Africa.
The practices of dry sex and virginity testing sharply bring into focus the 
provisions of the African Women’s Protocol that seek to eliminate harmful 
practices. Article 5 reads:
‘States Parties shall prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively 
affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognised international 
standards. States Parties shall take all necessary legislative and other measures to elimi-
nate such practices…’76
Article 5 expressly requires States Parties to create, through information, 
education and outreach programmes, public awareness regarding harmful 
practices.77 In the present context, Article 5(b) is of particular significance. 
It requires that ‘all forms of female genital mutilation, scarification, medi-
calisation and para-medicalisation of female genital mutilation and all other 
practices’78 are to be prohibited (and ultimately eradicated) through ‘legisla-
tive measures backed by sanctions’.79 The subsection thus envisages judicial 
support for women, including support in the form of health services.80 States 
Parties are furthermore required to protect women who are ‘at risk of being 
subjected to harmful practices or all other forms of violence, abuse and 
intolerance’.81
It was explained above82 how the practice of dry sex increases the risk 
of condom tearing,83 and that, in instances where no condoms are used, 
health workers warn of the increased probability that the vaginal wall will 
tear. Consequently women are exposed to an even greater risk of contract-
ing the HIV virus,84 or STD infections. It was also pointed out above85 how 
the pervasive (African) myth that sexual intercourse with a virgin cures HIV/
AIDS may unwittingly render women even more defenceless against acts of 
sexual violence, notably rape. Moreover, the practice of virginity testing may 
in fact encourage young girls to engage in unprotected anal sex,86 thus indeed 
increasing the risk of HIV/AIDS infection.87 Both sex practices thus implicate 
76 My emphasis.
77 See Art 5(a) of the African Women’s Protocol.
78 My emphasis.
79 My emphasis
80 See Art 5(c) of the African Women’s Protocol.
81 See Art 5(d) of the African Women’s Protocol. My emphasis.
82 See part 3.2 above.
83 See n 32 above.
84 See n 87 below.
85 See part 3.2 above.
86 See n 39 above.
87 South Africa is experiencing a maturing generalised HIV epidemic in which heterosexual sex is the 
predominant mode of transmission. HIV prevalence remains disproportionately high for females 
overall in comparison to males, and it peaks in the 25 to 29 age group. The UNAIDS defines South 
Africa’s epidemic as being hyper-endemic as a result of more than 15% of the population aged 15 to 
49 living with HIV. In 2007 an estimated 33 million people were living with HIV globally, with South 
Africa bearing a disproportionate burden with 35% of HIV infections occurring in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In South Africa, the highest prevalence of HIV is found in Kwazulu-Natal (15.8%), compared 
to the lowest prevalence in the Western Cape (3.8%). See, in particular, South African national HIV 
prevalence, incidence, behaviour and communication survey HSRC (2008) XV and Report on global 
AIDS epidemic UNAIDS (2008) Geneva. See also Stein J (n 40 above).
2009-2-text.indd   12 10/22/10   9:29:18 AM
13
THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL SEX PRACTICES 
the health and (sexual) well-being of women. The African Women’s Protocol 
entrenches the health and reproductive rights of women, including the right 
to control their fertility,88 the right to choose any method of contraception,89 
and the right to self-protection (and to be protected) against sexually trans-
mitted infections (STI), ‘including HIV/AIDS’.90
5.2 A South African (constitutional) perspective
The rather modest attempts by the South African legislature to address the 
practice of virginity testing in so far as children91 are concerned, point to 
the possible human rights implications of this practice. Two earlier versions 
of the Children’s Bill92 sought, respectively, to conditionally allow,93 and to 
prohibit,94 virginity tests performed on the (girl) child. Both these approaches 
have been incorporated into the Children’s Act.95
In terms of section 12 of the Children’s Act, social, cultural and religious 
practices affecting children are considered. To this end section 12(1) stipu-
lates:
‘Every child has the right not to be subjected to social, cultural and religious practices 
which are detrimental to his or her well-being.’
The issue of virginity testing is addressed under four subsections. Section 
12 of the Children’s Act introduces an age restriction,96 allows for informed 
consent,97 and seeks to protect the privacy98 and bodily integrity99 of the (girl) 
child. Section 12(4) reads:
‘Virginity testing of children under the age of 16 is prohibited.’
The question of consent is addressed in section 12(5)(a)-(c) which stipu-
lates:
‘Virginity testing of children older than 16 may only be performed (a) if the child has given 
consent to the testing in the prescribed manner; (b) after proper counselling of the child; 
and (c) in the manner prescribed.’
Section 12(6) recognises the (girl)child’s right to privacy by specifying that 
the ‘results of a virginity test may not be disclosed without the consent of the 
child’. Questions pertaining to both privacy and bodily integrity are addressed 
88 See Art 14(1)(a) of the African Women’s Protocol.
89 See Art 14(1)(c) of the African Women’s Protocol.
90 See Art 14(1)(d) of the African Women’s Protocol.
91 The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 defines ‘children’ as ‘human beings under the age of 18’.
92 Children’s Bill B70D-2003 published 13 December 2005 and Children’s Bill B70B-2003 published 
15 June 2005. 
93 Children’s Bill B70D-2003 (n 92 above).
94 Children’s Bill B70B-2003 (n 92 above). See also Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town 
‘Virginity testing and the Children’s Bill: Discussion paper’ (2005) available at http://web.uct.ac.za/
depts/ci/plr/docs/Virginity%20Testing%Discussion%20Paper%2010%20Oct%202005.doc [accessed 
30/04/08].
95 Act 38 of 2005.
96 See s 12(4) of Act 38 of 2005.
97 See s 12(5)(a)-(c) of Act 38 of 2005. 
98 See s 12(6) of Act 38 of 2005.
99 See s 12(7) of Act 38 of 2005.
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in section 12(7), which states that the ‘body of a child who has undergone 
virginity testing may not be marked’.
The second version of the Children’s Bill had contained a specific provision 
providing for criminal liability in the event of a contravention of section 12(3) 
(which proscribed ‘genital mutilation or the circumcision of female children’) 
and section 12(4) (which proscribed ‘virginity testing of children’)100. This 
specific provision was, however, omitted from the Children’s Act.
Within the broader African context, Article 17 of the United Nations Decla-
ration on the Rights of the Child101 and Article 10 of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (the ACRWC)102 both provide that ‘no child 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, 
family, home or correspondence or to unlawful attacks on his or her honour 
and reputation’. Similarly, the 1993 United Nations Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna103 sounded an historical call by stressing the importance 
of working towards the elimination of violence against women (and the girl 
child)104 in public and private life, and the eradication of any conflicts which 
may arise between the rights of women and the harmful effects of certain 
traditional or customary practices.
South Africa, through the ratification of a number of international treaties 
and conventions, is bound in terms of international law to recognise and 
protect the rights of children and to promote their realisation. South African 
courts are obliged to consider international law when interpreting the South 
African Constitution and Bill of Rights.105 Courts are likewise obliged to give 
preference to a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with 
international law, rather than any alternative interpretation that is inconsist-
ent with international (human rights) law.106
Within the African (human rights) context, the African Charter, too, places 
a distinct obligation on the African Commission to consider international 
declarations and conventions when considering the elimination of discrimi-
100 The provision read: ‘A person who contravenes subsection (3) or (4) or who permits such contra-
vention in respect of a child whom he or she is obliged to protect against maltreatment, abuse or 
degradation is guilty of an offence.’ 
101 GA Res 1386 UN GAOR 14th Sess Supp No 16 Agenda Item 64 19 UN Doc 4/4354 (1959).
102 Adopted 11 July 11 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 29 1999: OAU Doc CAB/
LEG/24.9/49 (1999). Article 14 of the ACRWC guarantees to every child the right ‘to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health’.
103 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action UN Doc A/49668 (1993) 14 HRLJ 352, (1993) 32 ILM 
1661.
104 See, for example, Art 21 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action which called for uni-
versal ratification by 1995 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child GA 
Res 44/25 UN GAOR 44th Sess Supp No 49 UN Doc A/44/736 (1989) (hereinafter referred to as 
the UNCRC). Article 19 of the UNCRC, for instance, instructs all States Parties to take appropriate 
measures ‘to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse’. 
105 See s 39(1) of the Constitution. The African Charter is of regional application. The mode of inter-
pretation favoured by the African Commission may, therefore, have significant impact on municipal 
legal systems that have ratified the African Charter.
106 See s 233 of the Constitution that reads: ‘When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer 
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.’
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nation against women and girls.107 The African Commission is further obliged 
to ‘draw inspiration from’108 various regional and international human rights 
instruments, including those adopted by the United Nations and African 
countries.109
The possible impact of dry sex and virginity testing on the constitution-
ally protected rights to human dignity, freedom and security of the person, 
equality, and privacy, will each be briefly considered next within the above 
contextual framework.
5.2.1 Human dignity
The right to human dignity proceeds from the assumption that the dignity of 
all humans must be respected by virtue of their membership of humanity.110 
Together with equality and freedom, dignity is a core value of the South Afri-
can legal and constitutional dispensation.111
In addressing the constitutional implications of the death penalty in S v 
Makwanyane,112 O’Regan J held that human dignity is an acknowledgement 
of the intrinsic worth of every human being.113 On this occasion the Consti-
tutional Court found that the death penalty treated human beings as objects, 
non-humans at the mercy of the state. The ensuing objectification and reduc-
tion in status are inconsistent with human dignity as a core constitutional 
value.114 Chaskalson J noted that, since the rights to life and dignity are the 
sources of all personal rights, they are fundamental to the rights enshrined 
in the Bill of Rights.115 Chaskalson J furthermore reiterated that, in the new 
South African dispensation, society is required to recognise life and dignity as 
precursors to all other rights conferred on the individual.116
Any practice that serves to objectify human beings violates the intrinsic 
worth of the individual. The practices of dry sex and virginity testing implicate 
women’s very (sexual) identity. These practices reduce women to sex objects, 
and thus impact on their status and value as human beings. It follows that dry 
sex and virginity testing cannot be tolerated by a legal community commit-
107 As expressed in Art 18(3) of the African Charter. See also n 53 and n 54 above.
108 See Article 60 of the African Charter that, by implication, refers to the protection afforded by CEDAW. 
See also Art 61 of the African Charter that requires that the African Commission consider African 
practices found to be consistent with international human rights norms.
109 Art 60 reads: ‘The [African] Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human 
and peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and 
peoples’ rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and 
by African countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as well as from the provisions of vari-
ous instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties 
to the present Charter are members.’
110 Section 10 of the Constitution reads: ‘Everyone has the right to human dignity.’
111 These three values are enshrined in ss 1(a), 7(1), 9, 10, 36(1) and 39(1)(a) of the Constitution.
112 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
113 At para 328.
114 At paras 328 – 329.
115 At para 144.
116 At para 144.
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ted to the eradication of all practices and traditions that violate the inherent 
dignity of an historically marginalised group, notably women.117
5.2.2 Freedom and security of the person
The South African Bill of Rights also entrenches the freedom and security of 
every person.118 To this end section 12 protects both the physical and psy-
chological integrity of the individual.119 The nature and extent of the state’s 
obligation in terms of section 12 were considered in Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety and Security.120 In this instance the Constitutional Court held that 
the state was obliged, through its organs, to respect, promote and protect the 
dignity, freedom and security of every individual. In particular, the right of 
women to be free from the threat of sexual violence was stressed.121 The state 
is, therefore, not merely obliged to proscribe harmful practices of a sexual 
nature, but is in fact reminded of its legal obligation to enforce all laws pro-
hibiting sexual violence against women.
The Carmichele decision is of particular significance in assessing the role 
of the state and its agents in relation to potentially harmful traditional prac-
tices. States may no longer pay mere lip service to the protection afforded 
to women under various national, regional and international human rights 
instruments. Instead, states must actively enforce mechanisms that seek to 
safeguard women from (sexual) harm. African states are thus compelled to 
realise the protection afforded to women under the African Charter and the 
African Women’s Protocol. It follows that traditional practices, such as, dry 
sex and virginity testing, will not prevail, once these are subjected to appro-
priate constitutional scrutiny.
5.2.3 Equality
The question whether a law or practice violates the non-discrimination provi-
sion contained in section 9(3) of the Constitution122 was considered in President 
of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo123 and in Harksen v Lane NO.124 In these 
117 See Art 5 of the African Charter that reads: ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the 
dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploita-
tion and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.’
118 See also Art 6 of the African Charter that reads: ‘Every individual shall have the right to liberty and 
to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and condi-
tions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.’ My 
emphasis.
119 Section 12 of the Constitution combines a right to freedom and security of the person with the right 
to bodily and psychological integrity. While the former includes the right to be free from all forms 
of violence from either public or private sources (s 12(1)(c)), the latter extends to issues concerning 
(female) reproduction (s 12(2)(a)), as well as security in, and control over, one’s body (s 12(2)(b)).
120 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).
121 At paras 30 and 32.
122 Section 9(3) of the Constitution reads: ‘The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth.’
123 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC).
124 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC).
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instances the Constitutional Court formulated a test to determine whether or 
not the differentiation in question is constitutionally problematic. Where the 
differentiation is based on any of the grounds expressly enumerated in sec-
tion 9(3), discrimination will have been shown.125 In order to assess whether 
the discrimination is also ‘unfair’ in the constitutional sense, courts must, 
inter alia, consider the position of the claimant in society, the nature of the 
action or provision, and the effect of the provision or action on the claimant’s 
rights.126
The traditional practices of dry sex and virginity testing clearly differentiate 
between men and women on the expressly enumerated (and interrelated)127 
grounds of sex and gender.128 Discrimination will, therefore, have been shown. 
In order to assess whether said discrimination is also ‘unfair’, the position of 
women in (South) African society must be considered.
It need not be argued that (African) women and girls constitute an histori-
cally vulnerable and decidedly marginalised group within society.129 Dry sex 
and virginity testing are by their nature invasive and violent. The patriarchal 
and cultural power in terms of which these practices are sanctioned is deeply 
entrenched. The impact on women’s dignity and their psychological and bod-
ily integrity is severe. The differentiation inherent in these two traditional 
practices cannot, therefore, be seen as ‘fair’, in the constitutional sense that 
this term has acquired. It follows that dry sex and virginity testing could be 
regarded as unfair discrimination in terms of South African constitutional 
jurisprudence.
5.2.4 Privacy
As pointed out above,130 both the testing of virginity and the communica-
tion of the results of the test are decidedly public events. Section 14 of the 
Constitution guarantees the right to privacy.131 The South African Human 
Rights Commission has indeed cautioned that girls identified as non-virgins 
are exposed to physical and emotional danger.132 In addition, girls who have 
been sexually abused, and who are identified as non-virgins, face increased 
risks of abandonment, rejection, and violence. Considering the significant 
negative consequences of being identified as a non-virgin, such public disclo-
125 At para 49.
126 At paras 50 – 51.
127 Since the dialectical conception of the relation between human nature and human society could 
be said to challenge the conceptual distinction between sex and gender, the sex/gender distinc-
tion becomes superfluous in a feminist critique of female (sexual) subordination: see, in general, 
MacKinnon CA ‘Feminism, Marxism, method, and the state: Toward feminist jurisprudence’ (1983) 
8 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 635. See also n 4 above.
128 On the significance of this, see n 127 and n 4 above.
129 This vulnerability has been duly acknowledged by South African courts: see, in general, Zondi v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 49 (N) and Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha 
2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).
130 See part 3.2 and accompanying footnotes above.
131 Section 14 of the Constitution reads: ‘ Everyone has the right to privacy, which shall include the right 
not to have – (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions 
seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.’
132 South African Human Rights Commission Position paper: Virginity testing (July 2005) 2.
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sure can place the girl or woman at considerable physical and emotional risk. 
This poses a no-win situation. As Carol Bower explains:
‘It really is a “Catch-22 situation” – if she refuses the test, she is suspected of “improper” 
conduct, if she takes it and fails, she is guilty of “improper” conduct. Either way she is 
publicly humiliated, devalued, and placed at physical and emotional risk.’133
In S v Jordan134 the Constitutional Court reiterated the correlation between 
privacy and the value of human dignity.135 It is self-evident that both the 
circumstances under – as well as the context within – which the practice 
of virginity testing is situated, constitute violations of the right to privacy in 
terms of section 14 of the Constitution.
5.2.5 Reasonable and justifiable limitation?
Once it has been established that a fundamental right has been infringed by 
law or conduct, the question whether the infringement can be justified as 
a permissible limitation of the particular right,136 must be considered. The 
criteria for a limitation of rights are laid down in section 36(1) of the Constitu-
tion, which stipulates that the law must be of general application and that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
Although the Constitutional Court has not directly addressed what would 
qualify as ‘law of general application’, it has given a wide interpretation to 
‘law’ elsewhere in the Constitution. This would include all forms of legisla-
tion137 as well as the common law and customary law.138 On the strength of 
this interpretation, a traditional practice sanctioned by customary law would 
thus only qualify as ‘law of general application’ if it applies in the same way to 
everyone that it regulates.139 The question to be decided, therefore, is whether 
the traditional practices of dry sex and virginity testing are specific or general 
in their application. If not general, then there can be no ‘law of general appli-
cation’ and thus no limitation of a fundamental right. It follows that the rule 
or practice must not apply solely to an individual case, nor must it restrict 
the rights only of a particular individual or group of individuals: the rule or 
practice must provide for parity of treatment – ‘like must be treated alike’.140 
Since both dry sex and virginity testing are traditional practices that women 
133 Bower C (n 41 above) 8 – 9. Emphasis in the original.
134 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) paras 81 – 83.
135 See also part 5.2.1 above.
136 But see Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), where the 
Constitutional Court indicated its willingness to depart from the two-stage approach to rights and 
their limitation in order to avoid having to decide the question whether a right has been infringed. 
For a critique of this approach, see De Waal J and Currie I ‘Limitation of rights’ in De Waal J and 
Currie I The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) 166 n 11.
137 In Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North-West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) para 27 the Consti-
tutional Court held that subordinate legislation applying to all educators in South Africa was a law 
of general application.
138 See Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) paras 44 and 136.
139 Equal application does not mean that a law must apply to everyone, but simply that it applies to 
everyone that it regulates, for example, broadcasters, in the same way: see Islamic Unity Convention 
v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC).
140 De Waal J and Currie I (n 136 above) 174.
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are subjected to by virtue of general cultural (or societal) norms and expecta-
tions, all women thus subjected are treated and affected in the same manner. 
The term ‘practice’ would indeed denote treatment and consequences of such 
a general (and inescapable) nature, thus implying parity of treatment. As a 
result, the practices of dry sex and virginity testing could thus be interpreted 
as ‘law(s) of general application’ in the constitutional sense that this term has 
acquired.
The question whether the restriction is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom, 
seeks to ascertain whether the restriction serves a constitutionally accept-
able purpose.141 There needs to be sufficient proportionality142 between the 
infringement and the purpose(s) of the law, rule or practice, which must be 
considered with reference to the set of ‘relevant factors’ contained in sec-
tion 36.143 These factors serve to establish whether the infringement serves a 
purpose that is considered legitimate by all reasonable citizens144 in a consti-
tutional democracy that values human dignity, equality and freedom ‘above 
all other considerations’.145
The constitutional impact of the practices of dry sex and virginity testing on 
women’s rights to dignity, equality, freedom and security of the person, and 
privacy has been argued above.146 And since the Constitution ‘seeks to estab-
lish a society where the individual value of each member of the community 
is recognised and treasured’,147 the practices of dry sex and virginity testing 
stand in direct conflict with the ideal of such a society, and the core constitu-
tional values of human dignity, equality, and freedom. Considered within this 
particular constitutional context, neither of these two traditional sex practices 
could thus be deemed constitutionally reasonable and justifiable.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
It cannot be denied that female sexuality is a determining factor in under-
standing the particular oppression of women and girls, and the ensuing harm. 
Dry sex and virginity testing constitute harmful traditional practices that 
infringe the inherent dignity of women, their freedom and security, and their 
rights to equality and privacy.
The African Commission does not sanction limitations on the rights of 
women, nor does it support the subordination of women to the community. 
African states have an obligation to ensure that the family unit, traditionally a 
private domain, does not become a haven for harmful sexually based gender-
specific practices. That obligation rests on us also. Failure to act decisively 
141 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 104.
142 See De Waal J and Currie I (n 136 above) 176.
143 These factors include: ‘(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose’.
144 See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
145 De Waal J and Currie I (n 136 above) 185.
146 See parts 5.2.1 – 5.2.3 and accompanying footnotes above.
147 Per O’Regan J in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 326.
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will indeed constitute tacit condonation of the sexually based subordination 
of women and girls.
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